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DISCUSSION*Is an Individual Nothing
But a Packet of Properties?
Concerning Individual objects such as the
Charles Bridge or the Etna the question may
be raised whether individuals do form a
reducible ontologica! category. The answer
to this question Is a dear "no" for those
philosophers who adhere to a substance
theory, or, as it is called these days, a theory
of the bare particular. According to these
philosophers, what makes a bundle of
properties an individual Is the bare particular
which is a pure individuator (and
partial la rizer),' This theory may be criticized
on the following grounds. Because the bare
individuator Is stripped of its properties, it is
something we cannot know, which means
that we are never able to say what makes
the Etna the Individual it Is. Postulating a
"something I know not what" is a solution to
which we should not Incline unless there is
no other way out Besides, on this theory the
bare particular consist merely of its being
related to its properties. But I do not see how
an entity a can stand in relation to something
else, b, if a consists merely of being related
to b. In order that something may be a term
in relation it must have other characteristics
besides being related in this way. And further
the regress argument against relation,
which can be found below , holds for the
relation between the bare particular and its
properties.
As a reaction to the substance-
theory, it is said that an individual is nothing
but a complex of properties. Russell is best
known defender of this theory.2 But the
theory had already been defended by Moore
in 1899.3 Moore's universe consists of
nothing but concepts: an existing individual is
nothing but a complex concept standing in
unique relation to the concept of existence.
Moore defends a one -category ontology: the
world consists of nothing but universals. At
first, this theory does not appear relevant for
philosophy today, but I will show that certain
version of this theory is defended these
days, and that this version may be criticized
along with the same line as Moore's theory.4
In this theory no account is given of the fact
that certain properties may exist together,
making up an individual, whereas others may
not: whiteness and grammaticality cannot be
properties of one individual, whereas an
individual which has redness as property
must also have colouredness and
extendedness as properties.
Secondly, how can it be accounted
for that there is more than one individual?
Because existence is a universal, K is the
same existence-concept which is related to
all properties which make up an individual.
This means that there is only one very
complex Individual. And, thirdly, how is it
possible that concepts become related to
each other: Bradley's regress argument
applies in a strong atomistic conception of
the universe. In order that concept A and
concept B may be related by concept R1
there has to be a concept R2 to relate A and
R1 and a concept R3 to relate B and R1.
Because we can always ask the question
'But what relates Rn to R n+1 ?' we never get
to a really relating concept. This means that
there can be no individuals, for they are
complexes of concepts standing in a certain
relation to the concept of existence. Suppose
this theory can account for relations, even
then It cannot account for relational order in
asymmetrical relations. (I only mention this
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criticism because it has no direct bearing on
the problem of individuals.) Roberto Casati,
one of the participants of the Workshop,
criticized the bundle theory of individuals
because it cannot account for change in
individuals: a different property implies a
different bundle. This criticism certainly
applies to Moore's theory, the first and the
third of these arguments against Moore's
theory are connected with the atomistic
position which is implied In one-category
ontology. In such an ontology no account
can be given of any connection between the
atomic entities, that is, the concepts. In order
to avoid confusion about the term atomism I
make a distinction between strong atomism
and weak atomism. Weak atomism is the
position that there are last unanalysable
elements, but that these elements are not all
there is. This position is exemplified in a
theory of the proposition which says that the
proposition can be analyzed into ultimate
components, but that it Is not reducible to
these components: the proposition is more
than the sum of its components (Bolzano's
position). Strong atomism, on the other hand,
says that there Is nothing but atomistic
entities. This is Moore's position. From now
on I will use the term 'atomism' as short for
'strong atomism'.
Another argument against this
theory was put forward by G.F. Stout In
1921.5 If this Is true that an Individual Is
nothing but a bundle of universal properties,
two Individuals with exactly the same
properties musf be identical, which means
that according to this theory the principle of
identity of indiscernables is necessary. But
because two individuals may be exactly alike
the principle is not necessary. From this
contradiction the conclusion is drawn that it
is not the case that the individual is nothing
but a bundle of universals. Whether this
argument is valid is dependent on the
statement that two different individuals may
be exactly alike, which is not accepted by
everyone, and on what you take as an
assumption in your reductio ad absurdum
argument, for it is possible to take a different
proposition as refuted assumption, for
example , that assumption that there is a
plurality of individuals.
According to Stout, an individual is
certainly nothing apart from its properties,
but properties are not to be identified with
repeatable universals. Properties are as
particular as the individuals to which they
belong, and most of them are entities in
space and time. The blueness of this ball is
not identical with the blueness of another
ball, even if these blues are of exactly the
same shade. According to this theory we
ought to distinguish between qualitative
Identity and numerical identity. Although the
colour-properties of the two balls are
qualitatively Identical, they are numerically
different, for there are two blues. In order to
distinguish particular properties from
universals Stout calls them abstract
particulars. These entities can only be
separated by the mind, because they
necessarily depend on their individuals for
their existence. Therefore they are called
abstract. This means that the difference
between abstract and concrete Is not the
same as the difference between general and
particular. A universal is abstract and
general, whereas a property is abstract and
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particular, for a property Is non-repealable. A
theory of abstract particulars can be very
useful to account for acts, processes, events,
boundaries, etc.
This idea of properties as abstract
particulars is defended at the present time by
some Australian philosophers,' most
explicitly by Keith Campbell, as for Stout, an
individual is nothing apart from its abstract
particulars. But there is also an important
difference between the two theories.
Whereas Stout recognizes besides abstract
particulars individuals as separate ontological
category, for Campbell there is only one
category, that of abstract particulars.
Connected with this position is Campbell's
idea that certain abstract particulars, such as
the blue of the sky, may exist independently.
Campbell's one-category theory strongly
resembles Moore's, except that the category
Is not that of concepts but of abstract
particulars, or tropes as he sometimes calls
them following DC. Williams. Campbell's
theory is open to the same criticism as
Moore's except that some arguments have to
be reformulated.' Universals and individuals
may be seen as two different dimensions in
which tropes may be grouped. In this sense
there is a correspondence with Mach's
Theory of 'Empfindungen' in his book
Analyse der Empfindungen (Leipzig, 1886).
Mach conceives of the I and the world as
constructed out of neutral group of elements
CEIemente' or 'Empfindungen'). The common
core enables the two theories to bridge the
gap between universels and individuals, or
between I and world. The theory of abstract
particulars is historically related to the
psychology of perception, of which Mach is
a representative. The red as perceived Is a
particular. When this entity is Interpreted as
existing independently of a perceiving act, as
for example Stout interpreted it, we easily
get a theory of abstract particulars.
This theory is a variant of logical
realism which tries to overcome the gap
between logical entities on the one hand and
physical objects and the knowing mind on
the other hand. I may directly perceive the
blueness of this ball, and that blueness is
part of the universal blueness. I will not
concentrate on the epistemological problems
with which a trope-theory is confronted, but
these problems arise immediately because of
the impossibility of relations in a one-
category theory. How can my mind, which is
nothing but a cluster of tropes, ever become
connected with a trope which is not
compresent with it?
Whether a group must be
conceived of as a collection, bundle, or set,
or rather as a sum, is not so clearly stated
by Campbell. The individual is not a sum of
tropes, for Campbell denies that the relation
between an individual and its tropes is a
relation between a complex whole and Its
simpler parts.6 This means that the relation
between tropes and the individual is
probably a membership-relation, and that
the Individual is a set or bundle of tropes.
But a set or bundle is certainly not a trope,
it belongs rather to the category of concrete
particulars, that is, of real individuals. On the
other hand, if the individual is nothing but
tropes with a relation of compresence, this
relation must itself be a trope. But how can
this special trope hold the other tropes
together. How can it connect? As in
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Moore'ws theory, the Infinitive regress
argument against relation holds.
But suppose the relation of
compresence does relate, which tropes are
related by this relation? Does it relate trope
1 and trope 2, or trope 1,2 and 3, or trope 1
and 3? Where does one individual end and
another begin?
The relation of compresence is
neither necessary nor sufficient to account
for individuals. Apart from the problem that
not all individuals are in space, some
individuals cannot be described as a group
of tropes with a relation of compresence
because its tropes are not compresent at all,
such as the United Kingdom as it existed in
the nineteenth century. And not every group
of tropes together with a relation of
compresence forms an individual: not every
arbitrary part of the group of tropes which
does make up an individual is itself an
individual, although these tropes are
compresent. Or a compresent group makes
up more than one individual: Jonah still
existed as independent individual after he
was eaten by the whale.
The problem of relational order does
not arise for a symmetrical relation like of
compresence. For asymmetrical relations
Campbell Introduces the concept of filling the
initial place in a relational fact afib." But
such a structured fact is not merely a sum of
tropes, but a structured whole of a, R and b,
something which many less strict minds are
not inclined to accept in their ontology.
As with Moore's theory no
explanation can be given of the fact that
certain tropes are necessarily part of one
individual, whereas others necessarily are
not. For tropes are as simple as Moore's
concepts. In one place Campbell suggests
that certain tropes are dependent on
others.10 This means either that they are
connected by a relation of dependence —
which is not possible because of the
impossibility of any relation: or that there are
both independent and dependent entities —
which amounts to a two-category ontology.
It is dear that tropes fulfil both the
nature-providing role and the particularizing
role. But do they also fulfil the individuating
role as is suggested by Campbell?11 Does
each trope individuate itself and the
individual to which it belongs? Campbell
clearly says that the individuation of the
trope itself is basic and unanalysable.12 But
what makes what we normally call an
individual this individual? How is it possible
that its tropes, including the relation of
compresence, make an individual this
individual as Campbell suggest? Do these
tropes have one aspect in common, so that
each makes the individual the individual it is,
or can they fulfil the individuating role only
together?
Because I do not see how tropes
can individuate an individual, I cannot
conceive of a group of tropes as being
something different from a complex property.
This is not meant as an argument against
Campbell's theory, but rather as an attempt
to understand. I cannot see that what makes
an individual this individual is something
different from the individual itself. It seem
that we are in need of an extra ontological
category besides the trope. All the tropes of
an individual determine its nature, which
means that a trope forms part of nature of an
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individual. Tropes are necessarily dependent
on the individual to which they belong: they
are dependent parts. There are also parts of
the individual as existent, such as my hand
or my nose: these are not necessarily
dependent parts. A theory which
acknowledges dependent entities {particular
properties and relations) and independent
entities (individuals, and propositions or
states of affairs) is not committed to an
atomistic position in the way a one-category
ontology is. Bradle's regress does not hold if
a relation is dependent entity which is part of
an independently existing complex consisting
of the relation and the related terms.
According to Campbell, "any two-
category theory is going to be bedeviled by
a non-relational tie problem"*", that is the
problem of inherence of a property In an
individual. Is this also the case for the two-
category theory here proposed? I think not
There is no problem about how an individual
may be connected to its properties, if
properties are conceived of as dependent or
incomplete entities. Only if we start with two
complete and independent entities does the
problem arise as to how these entities can
ever be connected. Campbell's point makes
sense only for a two-category theory which
is as atomistic as his own.
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